One potential consequence of rising concentration of income at the top of the distribution is increased borrowing, as less affluent households attempt to maintain standards of living with less income. This paper explores the "keeping up with the Joneses" phenomenon using data from the Survey of Consumer Finances. Specifically, it examines the responsiveness of payment-toincome ratios for different debt types at different parts of the income distribution to changes in the income thresholds at the 95 th and 99 th percentiles. The analysis provides some evidence indicating that household debt payments are responsive to rising top incomes. Middle and uppermiddle income households take on more housing-related debt and have higher housing debt payment to income ratios in places with higher top income levels. Among households at the bottom of the income distribution there is a decline in non-mortgage borrowing and debt payments in areas with rising top-income levels, consistent with restrictions in the supply of credit. The analysis also consistently shows that 95 th percentile income has a greater influence on borrowing and debt payment across in the rest of the distribution than the more affluent 99 th percentile level.
Introduction
Rising levels of income inequality have long been recognized by researchers in the US and other wealthy countries (Morelli, Smeeding, and Thompson, 2015) . High-level policymakers are increasingly acknowledging the widening of the distribution of income as an area of concern.
Indeed, in 2014 the head of the International Monetary Fund 1 and the Chair of the Federal
Reserve Board 2 each gave important addresses on the subject of income inequality (and equality of opportunity), and in December 2013 President Obama identified income inequality and inadequate mobility as the "defining challenge of our time." This new attention by policymakers is partly a result of inequality continuing to rise, and partly due to other changes in the conversation around inequality. Commentary and research on the topic are increasingly asking about the potential consequences of inequality (Thompson and Leight, 2013) . Instead of simply representing a distributional outcome which might be considered "unfair," rising income inequality itself may actually be producing potentially harmful outcomes. There is already a well-established, if unsettled, literature on the effects of inequality on overall levels of economic growth, and other potential consequences are also being explored.
One of those questions concerns the consequences of rising top income inequality on consumption and debt of households lower down the distribution. As the share of income held by households at the very top of the distribution has risen to the highest levels in generations (Figure 1) , household borrowing has also climbed to historic high levels (Figure 2) , and earnings across the broad middle and bottom of the distribution have experienced little growth.
Several recent papers explore the link between inequality and consumption and borrowing (Bertrand and Morse, 2013; Coibion et al, 2014, and; Bricker, Ramcharan, and Krimmel, 2014) .
This paper extends the budding literature on this question; it uses data from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) to explore how changes in the income levels at the 95 th and 99 th percentiles of the distribution at the state-level have impacted borrowing and debt payments of 1 http://wallstcheatsheet.com/politics/imf-head-inequality-will-haunt-the-21st-century.html/?a=viewall 2 http://www.bostonfed.org/inequality2014/agenda/index.htm 3 http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/12/04/remarks-president-economic-mobility households further down the income distribution. The contributions this paper makes to the literature include using superior data, as well improved outcome and inequality measures.
Borrowing and debt payments are arguably better outcome measures than consumption in capturing an unsustainable household response to rising inequality. Changes in high-income levels, particularly at the 99 th percentile, are also a better measure of the inequality signal that might influence households at various parts of the distribution than other measures such as the P90/P10 ratio or the Gini coefficient. 4 The results from this paper indicate that household borrowing and debt payment does respond to changes in top-income levels, and that this response is primarily concentrated in housing-related debt payments and among households in the upper-middle and middle portions of the income distribution. These households are going into greater housing-related debt in places where top incomes are rising faster for reasons than cannot simply be explained by home prices; the results condition on MSA-level variation in quality-adjusted rent and elasticity of the housing supply as well as time-varying MSA-level measures of changes in average home prices, as well as length of household tenure. The findings also confirm that rising top incomes are associated with decreases in non-mortgage borrowing and payments. The paper proceeds in the next section by discussing different mechanisms by which income inequality could lead to increased consumption and debt among non-affluent households and several of the recent papers exploring this topic. Section three highlights the contribution made by this paper, the data used, and the empirical strategy. Section four discusses the findings, and section five concludes.
The Influence of Inequality on Consumption and Debt
There are multiple channels through which increasing inequality in the distribution of income could lead to higher consumption and greater levels of household debt. Broadly, the influence of inequality could work through the supply of credit or the demand for credit.
Financial institutions could use increasing inequality of income within a region as information to help them target credit (Coibion et al, 2014) . Alternatively, there are a variety of ways rising inequality could affect the demand for credit (Bertrand and Morse, 2013) . If households value 4 I also argue that residential sorting makes using very small geographic areas problematic for understanding the relationship between inequality and consumption, and that use of broader aggregates such as the state-level, as employed in this paper, is preferred.
their consumption relative to peer groups (including aspirational benchmark groups with somewhat higher incomes), rising incomes at the top of the distribution could lead to "expenditure cascades" where households further down the distribution increase their spending to maintain their relative status (Levine, Frank, and Dijk, 2010) . Alternatively, rising top incomes could lead to a rising supply of "rich" goods in a market or rising prices for supplyconstrained good and services, both of which could result in higher levels of consumption and debt among households across the rest of the distribution.
One recent paper addresses the way households signal status to their neighbors, and explores how changing inequality might influence signaling consumption. Bricker, Ramcharan, and Krimmel (2014) (BRK) argue that increased dispersion of incomes within a community increases the importance of using consumption to signal status to ones neighbors. They use data from the SCF and Census-tract level measures of income to explore the relationship between luxury car-buying and local income inequality. They find that census tracts with greater inequality do experience higher levels of luxury car-buying and household debt.
There are two important limitations of the analysis by BRK for understanding the implications of the rising levels of inequality in recent decades. The first is their use of a measure of inequality (Gini) that does not distinguish between changes in income at the top or bottom of the distribution. The Gini coefficient is a widely available distribution statistics, and one of the only measures available at the tract level, but it is relatively insensitive to changes in income at the top of the distribution. Compared to other distribution statistics, the Gini coefficient reveals the lowest levels of change in inequality in recent decades (Figure 3) . The Gini coefficient does have a number of strengths, but it does a poor job of capturing the aspects of changing incomerising concentration at the top of the distribution -that has captured the public imagination in recent years.
The second limitation of BKR is their use of very small area geography, focusing on Census-tract level income in their analysis. One artifact of the way in which households sort themselves residentially, however, is that high-income communities experience the lowest levels of within-county inequality, and have seen the least change in within-county inequality over time. The findings of Bertrand and Morse (2013) are only an obvious concern if the higher levels of consumption they identify are not supported by higher current or future levels of household income. One important limitation of their analysis is that the CEX is a weak foundation on which to "hold income constant." The CEX has serious problems with underreporting of income at the bottom of the distribution, in addition to its problems reporting income and consumption at the top Groen, 2000) . An additional potential limitations of the Bertrand and Morse's (2013) findings are that, while they report rising levels of certain types of consumption, rising inequality could also be related to changes in the composition of consumption, leading them to overstate (or understate) the extent of the change in consumption.
Finally, the 90 th percentile of the distribution is substantially lower than the income levels most Americans regard as "rich" and may be insufficient to capture the aspects of changes in the distribution that are capable of shaping the consumption behavior across the distribution. 5 In 2014 household taxable income at the 90 th percentile was $121,000, equivalent to the family income of a married couple where one partner is a police officer ($60,000 average annual earnings) and the other is a secondary-level special education teacher ($61,000). 6 At the 99 th percentile taxable income was $423,000 (Saez, 2015 ).
An entirely different mechanism through which rising inequality might influence consumption and debt is through the supply side of the credit market. If creditors use information on income levels and local distributions of income to identify credit risk, then rising inequality might result in less credit being made available to lower-income households in high inequality areas. Coibion et al (2014) propose this outcome and test it using data from the FRBNY Consumer Credit Panel/ Equifax Data. They find that low-income households in high-inequality areas accumulated less debt and had lower credit limits than their low-income counterparts in areas with lower inequality.
Coibion et al (2014) interpret these findings as a rejection of the "keeping up with the Joneses," "trickle-down consumption" story, but this conclusion warrants additional caveats. Their paper focuses primarily on household in the bottom fifth of the income distribution, but low-income families are not the only -or even the primary -group presumed to be impacted by the potential consequences of rising top-end inequality. Thompson and Leight (2012) find a negative correlation between state-level top-income shares and average income levels at the middle of the distribution, but no relationship at the bottom. Bertrand and Morse (2013) only find any consumption response among households above the bottom quintile of the distribution.
Another limitation of Coibion et al (2014) is the fact that the consumer credit panel data does not include income; they have information on household borrowing, credit scores, and location but not their incomes. Instead they predict household income based on the relationship between assets, debt, and income observed in the SCF. Ultimately the income variable used to 5 Opinions on the income level required to be "rich" vary with household income level. A 2014 yougov survey of 1,000 households found that households with income less than $25,000 felt (on average) that someone would need an income of $293,000 to be considered rich. For households with incomes between $30,000 and $60,000 the income needed to be considered "rich" was $394,000; for households between $60,001 and $120,000 rich income was $426,000, and for those with income above $120,000 it was $501,000 (Vavreck, 2014 identify a households location in the distribution as well as the area-level distribution statistic (P90/P10) are all based on predicted income. Biases and any other problems in these predictions could be driving the relationships identified by Coibion et al (2014) .
Empirical Approach and Data
Each of the recent papers exploring this question has made important contributions to understanding the potential consequences of rising income inequality, but each is subject to limitations and shortcomings. This paper hopes to overcome some of those limitations by using superior data, measures of inequality that are better suited to testing the impacts of rising income at the top of the distribution, and emphasis on measures of debt over consumption. Using the SCF is an improvement over the use of the CEX data by Bertrand and Morse (2013) measure with indicators for portions of the lower part of the distribution. The primary aim is to discover if there is a relationship between top-income levels, and for which income groups and which debt types it is strongest.
The Survey of Consumer Finances
We use data from the nine waves of the Federal Reserve Board's triennial Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) conducted between 1989 and 2013. Several features of the SCF make it appropriate for addressing the questions of interest. The survey collects very detailed information about households' financial assets and liabilities, and has employed a consistent instrument and sample frame since 1989. As a survey of household finances and wealth, the SCF includes some assets that are broadly shared across the population (bank savings accounts) as well some that are held more narrowly and that are concentrated in the tails of the distribution (direct ownership of bonds). 7 To support estimates of a variety of financial characteristics as well as the overall distribution of wealth, the survey employs a dual-frame sample design.
A national area-probability (AP) sample provides good coverage of widely spread characteristics. The AP sample selects household units with equal probability from primary sampling units that are selected through a multistage selection procedure, which includes stratification by a variety of characteristics, and selection proportional to their population.
Because of the concentration of assets and non-random survey response by wealth, the SCF also employs a list sample which is developed from statistical records derived from tax returns under an agreement with SOI. 8 (See Bricker et al (2014) for additional details on the SCF list sample.)
This list sample consists of households with a high probability of having high net worth. 9 The SCF joins the observations from the AP and list sample through weighting. 10 The weighting design adjusts each sample separately using all the useful information that can be brought to bear 7 It is important to emphasize that the publicly-released SCF data are cleaned of any identifying information about the responding family, including any geographic information about the family. The Federal Reserve does release summary information by Census region, though (see . The empirical analysis in this paper uses the internal SCF data in order to identify the household's state, MSA, and county of residence. 8 See Wilson and William J. Smith (1983) and Internal Revenue Service (1992) for a description of the SOI file. The file used for each survey largely contains data from tax returns filed for the tax year two years before the year the survey takes place. 9 For reasons related to cost control on the survey, the geographic distribution of the list sample is constrained to that of the area-probability sample. 10 The evolution of the SCF weighting design is summarized in Kennickell (2000) .
in creating post-strata. The final weights are adjusted so that the combined sample is nationally representative of the population and assets. 11 These weights are used in all regressions.
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The key outcome variables explored in this paper are debt payments, specifically "payment to income ratios" (PIRs) for three broad debt classes: total debt, mortgage-related debt, and other (primarily consumer) "non-mortgage" debt. Total debt reflects all types of debt, including credit cards, mortgage debt, student loans, business debts, and other miscellaneous types of debt, and is reported by the respondent at the time of the interview. The specific dependent variables used in the regressions below are payment to income ratios for overall debt payments as well as for specific debt types (mortgage debt and nonmortgage debt). 14 In a series of robustness checks, we also report some results using other dependent variables, including total debt to income ratios, indicators for "high levels" of debt (PIR>.40), and PIRs for a broader housing payment measure including rent payments for nonhomeowners. In addition to household finances, the SCF also collects some basic demographic and labor market information, primarily for the household head and spouse, including race, age, educational attainment, number of children, family-type, labor force status, occupation, industry, and housing tenure. These are included in the regressions as control variables, and are summarized in Appendix Table 1 . 11 The SCF weights were revised in 1998 to incorporate home ownership rates by race (Kennickel, 1999) . Weights for earlier years were updated to reflect the revised methodology. 12 Standard errors for all regressions are calculated in STATA using "scfcombo" using 999 bootstrapped replications of scf weights to reflect multiple imputation and sample design. 13 Assets do not include -and the SCF does not collect information on the value of -defined benefit pensions or the implied annuity value behind future or current Social Security benefits of respondents. 14 PIRs are truncated at 3.0 to restrict the impact of a limited number of extreme PIR values that are a result of very low imputed income values and households experiencing transitory income shocks. The extreme PIR value is further diminished by using "normal" income in the denominator when measuring PIR.
An important part of this analysis explores differences in the relationship between top income and PIRs at different parts of the income distribution. A families' location in the statelevel income distribution is based on household-level income from the SCF and state-level information on the distribution of taxable income from the IRS (Frank, Sommeiller, Price, Saez, 2015) . The income groupings we evaluate include top/bottom halves, thirds of the distribution, and a continuous measure of "relative income" which is simply family income divided by statelevel average income.
Location in the distribution is calculated using the incomes families report that they "usually" receive in a "normal" year -referred to as "normal income." Specifically, when inquiring about income, the SCF asks respondents to note whether their total income is unusually high or low relative to a normal year. If income was unusually high or low then a follow-up question is asked about what the family's income is in a typical year. This "normal" family income measure, then, should be a measure of income that smooths transitory income shocks and can approximate the family's permanent income.
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The unit of analysis in the SCF is the "primary economic unit" (PEU) which refers to a financially-dependent related (by blood, marriage, or unmarried partners) group living together.
This concept is distinct from either the household or family units employed by the Census
Bureau, but is conceptually closer to the latter, and throughout this paper PEUs are referred to as "families." 16 Single individuals living alone are included and simply considered a "family" of one.
High Incomes and Other Data
The inequality measures used in the analysis are the income levels of households at the top of the distribution, specifically threshold income levels at the 95 th and 99 th percentiles of the 15 See Krimmel, Moore, Sabelhaus, and Smith (2013): "The concept of 'normal' income in the SCF is conceptually and empirically close to the concept of "permanent" income that economists generally consider when they describe consumer behavior. The label "normal" stems from a question posed to SCF respondents; after they report their actual income, they are asked whether they consider the current year a 'normal' year. If respondents state it is not a normal year, they are asked to report a value for 'normal' income. Actual and normal income are the same for most respondents. However, Ackerman and Sabelhaus (2012) show that the deviations from normal for the subset who report such deviations provide a relationship between actual and permanent income consistent with estimates of transitory shocks using panel income data." 16 A typical question in the SCF asks the respondent to consider "you and your family living here" in providing answers. (2003) and produce similar levels and trends for top-income shares (Figure 1) . The mean of state P90 income levels in 2013 is $110,000 (min. $86,000/max. $144,000), for state P95 it was $151,000 (min. $118,000/max.
$220,000), and for state P99 it was $341,000 (min. $237,000/max. $635,000) (Appendix Table   1 ). In the analysis, these top-income threshold measure are linked to the SCF data through the respondent's state of residence.
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The primary focus in this paper is how changes in income at the 99 th percentile influence borrowing at lower parts of the income distribution. This top-income level is closer to what is commonly regarded as "rich," and it is also the case that changes over time at the 99 th percentile have been much larger and have exhibited considerably more variation across states (Figure 6 ). Table 2 ).
The analysis also includes a number of additional covariates to control for potential confounding factors. Summary statistics for these covariates are also reported in Appendix Table   1 , and they include:
Income Taxes: The maximum combined state and federal marginal tax rates on wage income provided by the NBER Taxsim program (Feenberg and Couts, 1993 
Results
The simplest regressions indicate that being in a state with a higher level of 95 th percentile income is positively correlated with a higher overall payment-to-income ratio. the 95 th percentile income threshold in natural log form, a one standard deviation ($27,000 in 2013) increase in the high-income level results in a 1.4 percentage point increase in the total PIR (Column 5).
In the remaining regressions we continue to use the natural log of the high-income thresholds as the coefficient of interest, exploring the impacts on a variety of outcome measures, with different income concepts, and over different parts of the income distribution.
Alternative high-income thresholds and income concepts
In Table 2 we use the continuous measure of PIR and also the natural log of the highincome threshold. We begin to explore the sensitivity of the relationship between PIR and highincome thresholds to different high-income levels and also to different income concepts to calculate the PIR measure. Much of the conversation around inequality in recent years has focused on very high income levels, and the incomes of the top 1 percent are indeed much larger than those at the 90 th and 95 th percentiles. In this table we start using the state-level 99 th percentile income as the key independent variable. We also explore the sensitivity to using normal income as the denominator of the PIR. Normal income smooths out transitory fluctuations. Households experiencing transitory shocks may have measured PIRs are much higher what they typically face; mean total PIR using normal income is lower than PIR with actual income and has a substantially smaller standard deviation (Appendix Table 1 ). Since the "normal" income questions have only been asked since 1995, Table 2 restricts some specifications to those years.
Using normal income to calculate PIR results in a modest reduction in the measured relationship between 95 th percentile incomes at PIR (Columns 2, 3) , and suggests a 1 SD increase in the 95 th percentile threshold income results in 1.6 percentage point increase in total PIR. Switching to the use of the 99 th percentile income level has a more dramatic impact. Using the 99 th percentile, the effect of a 1 SD ($89,000 in 2013) increase in top income levels on total PIR falls to 0.6 percentage points (Column 6).
That PIR -at the mean of the data -appears more responsive to changes in 95 th percentile income than 99 th percentile income is consistent with the idea that the benchmark income/consumption levels that household target is set by their somewhat nearer neighbors in the income distribution.
Exploring Debt Types and Impacts at Different Points of the Income Distribution
In the specifications shown in the next several tables, we begin to explore how using different debt types influences the relationship between PIR and high-incomes, and also how this relationship varies across the income distribution. Table 3 includes the results from six different specifications using interactions between two different top-income thresholds (P95, P99) and an indicator for being in the top-half of the state-level distribution of income and three different PIR dependent variables (total PIR, mortgage PIR, and non-mortgage PIR).
Key patterns that begin to emerge in these results are that the overall relationship between PIR and high incomes is strongest for mortgage debt, that mortgage debt of higher-income households is more responsive to top-income levels, and that the non-mortgage PIR of lowerincome households is negatively related to high-income thresholds.
Rising top 1 percent incomes have no statistically significant effect on overall debt PIR or mortgage debt PIR for the bottom half of households (Columns 4, 5). The non-mortgage debt PIRs, however, fall 0.8 percentage points with a 1 SD increase in top 1 percent income levels (Column 6), broadly consistent with the findings of Coibion et al (2014) . In the top half of the income distribution a 1 SD increase in top 1 percent income is associated with a 1.2 percentage point increase in the mortgage PIR, but no change in non-mortgage PIR.
Compared to increases in top 1 percent incomes, rising levels of income at the 95 th percentile of the income distribution are associated with similar effects on non-mortgage debt, but consistently larger effects on mortgage debt. A 1 SD increase in the top 5 percent threshold income level is associated with a 0.9 percentage point increase in mortgage PIR for households in the bottom half of the income distribution and a 1.7 percentage point increase for those in the top half (Column 2).
The additional covariates used in the regressions also differ in expected ways across the different dependent variables. Coefficients on the real estate covariates are typically statistically significant and of the expected sign for specifications using total PIR and mortgage PIR, but not for those using non-mortgage debt to calculate the PIR. The zip-code level risk score measure is positive and significant for mortgage PIR, but negative and significant for non-mortgage PIR, also consistent with credit supply restrictions.
In Table 4 we explore additional income distribution interactions, reporting only the key coefficient from twelve specification. These results extend what we showed in Table 3 (using two top-income thresholds and three PIR dependent variables) to two additional types of distribution interactions. We report the key coefficients from the top-half interaction from Table   3 in Panel A, and also add results from specifications using thirds of the distribution (Panel B), and a continuous measure of "relative income" in Panel C.
21
The results in Table 4 21 All specifications in Table 3 use the normal income concept to calculate PIR and to locate households in the state-level distribution of income. The top half of the state-level distribution is made-up of households with normal income above average taxable income; the middle-third of the distribution has "relative income" above 0.75 and below 1.25. "Relative income" is defined as normal income divided by state-level average taxable income.
Alternative Dependent Variables
Payment to income ratios are the preferred measure of debt as they give the best indication of how manageable the level of indebtedness is for a household. Payments, though, are also influenced by the interest charged on the debt, and we might worry that trends in interest rates might be correlated with trends in high-income thresholds and introduce bias into our PIR regressions shown above. Below in Table 5 Panel A we report the key coefficients from our preferred specifications, but substituting the debt level to income ratio as the dependent variable.
The results are broadly similar, suggesting that interest rates or other factors affecting payments cannot account for the observed relationship between high-income thresholds and debt of households further down the income distribution. As with the PIR measures, we see that rising 
4.3b. High PIR Regressions
Payment to income ratios are sometimes used to identify households with high debt levels that might be an indication of experiencing financial distress. Commonly a PIR above 0.4 is regarded as "high." Small changes in the average PIR could potentially miss changes in the number of households experiencing high PIR, understating the implications for debt of rising top incomes. In Table 5 Panel B we replicate the preferred specifications using "high PIR" (by debt 
4.3c. Combined Rent + Mortgage PIR Regressions
So far we have found that rising top incomes seem to have a substantial effect on mortgage-related debt payments. Many households, however, are renters and do not pay any mortgage. It is possible that the decision to own versus rent could be related to changes in top income levels, which could bias our results looking at mortgage PIRs. In Table 5 , Panel C we report key coefficients from two additional specifications, reproducing our preferred specifications using the combined mortgage plus rent PIR as the dependent variable. When we include rent in the PIR, we see even more strongly that the effects of rising top incomes are isolated to the top half of the distribution. For both the 95 th and 99 th percentile thresholds, the coefficients fall sharply in the bottom half of the distribution and rise by roughly the same amount in the top half.
Conclusion and Discussion
This paper uses data from the Survey of Consumer Finances and state-level data from the IRS on high-income levels to explore the relationship between rising top-incomes and borrowing and debt payments among households further down the income distribution. The findings indicate the "trickle-down" consumption identified by Bertrand and Morse (2013) -the part financed through debt at least -seems to be primarily evident in housing. Payments on mortgage debt are higher in states where the high-income thresholds are higher.
The responsiveness of mortgage debt payment also appears to be largely isolated to the top half of the income distribution. This suggests that any debt-linked "expenditure cascade" in response to rising incomes at the very top -referred to as "keeping up with the slightly richer neighbors" by Freeland (2012) -does not extend to the lower portions of the income distribution.
These results are consistent with multiple explanations, including consumption benchmarking and price effects. The standard interpretation of "keeping up with the Joneses"
implies that the consumption of a somewhat more affluent reference group influences the behavior of somewhat less affluent consumers. In this case, it could be that rising top incomes are fueling increased housing consumption at the top, which in turn inspires debt-financed housing consumption further down the distribution. Alternatively (or also), rising disposable income at the top of the distribution could be helping to bid up the price of land and housing in affluent neighborhoods. Since we include a variety of MSA-level real estate controls, price effects would have to be within the MSA (CBSA) level to account for our findings.
Thoughout the paper we consistently find that changes in the 95 th percentile income levels are more strongly associated with debt levels and payments of non-affluent households than changes at the 99 th percentile level. Income at the 95 th percentile ($151,000 in 2013) is a marker of economic success for households, but it is conceptually quite different from conversations of the "top 1%" or "the rich and rest of us." Income at the 95 th percentile exhibits far less variation across states or change over time compared to the 99 th percentile. The stronger impacts of 95 th percentile incomes are consistent with the "expenditure cascade" (Levine, Frank, and Dijk (2014) ) concept, suggesting households do respond to "upper income" levels that are closer to them in the distribution and arguably more salient.
The results are also generally supportive of the findings of Coibion et al (2014) and the negative relationship they identify between inequality and debt among low-income households.
We find that non-mortage debt levels and payments are lower in the bottom half of the income distribution where top-income levels are higher. Rising top incomes could be used by lenders to target the supply of non-mortgage credit in ways which restrict access to debt among lowerincome families. 
